1968년 미국 포터 대사가 미국 태평양 지역 사령관에게 보낸 전문을 보니 다음과 같은 내용이 있습니다


- 1.21 청와대 습격 사건 이후 한국이 계획한 4월 5일자 국방부 계획은 선제공격도 가능한 수준 

 

북한이 1.21 청와대 습격 사건같은 일을 또 벌이면 한국은 이것을 기회로 삼아 북침을 할 수도 있다

 

- 한국 정부는 강대국이 개입할 시간을 주지 않고 순식간에 북한을 꿀꺽하면 강대국은 그냥 현실을 인정할 수 밖에 없을 것이라고 생각

  ROK national leadership believes that if reunification can be effected rapidly by military means, the great powers will not intervene and will accept the fait accompli.

 

- 그리고 1년 전 1967년 6월 이스라엘이 크게 재미를 본 공군의 선제기습공격을 우리도 따라하자는 생각이 4월 5일자 계획에 있었던 것 같습니다 ( give ROKAF a higher capability for surprise quick strike action ).




http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d193


193. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1

5708. Ref: Seoul A505.2

1. In ref airgram I transmitted ROK MND plan he proposed surface at aborted Honolulu meeting of April 7. I assume MND will now bring it up at April 17 meeting. I want to bring this plan to your attention now since Bonesteel has sent message to Sharp on it.3 In view of his message, I felt it would be useful to you to have in advance conclusions of politico-military assessment prepared by Embassy on the MND plan and ROK strategic intentions.4 Will have full paper with me at Honolulu for you and others to read and ponder. Following paragraph contains conclusions:5

2. “22 [21]. The April 5 MND plan would provide a force structure and equipment capability vis-e-vis North Korean which would:

A. Give the ROK ground forces an advantage in quantitative combat power, an advantage considered to be beyond the needs of a purely defensive mission, assuming adequate US augmentations.

B. Enable the ROK Air Force to match more nearly the combat strength supported by a hardened base structure as possessed by North Korea, and give ROKAF a higher capability for surprise quick strike action.

C. Greatly increase the Navy/Marine offensive capability by establishing about a division size amphibious force with a commensurate increase in shore bombardment means, as well as a significant surface striking force.

23 [22]. The implementation of the April 5 MND plan would provide the ROK with an increased military capability which could, without US support or sanction, engage in retaliatory actions of greater scope and magnitude against the North.

24 [23]. If logistic needs were accumulated in advance or logistic support from some source assured, the force structure contemplated in the April 5 MND plan could tempt the ROKG to undertake a preemptive attack against the North in the belief that it could win a relatively short war.

25 [24]. There are therefore grounds for serious concern that the ROK national leadership may be contemplating military moves which may range from substantially larger retaliatory actions to a preemptive strike against the North to effect reunification. A move of the latter type would be initiated at an appropriate time but prior to the anticipated overt military action by the North. The ROKs may in fact be counting on another dramatic raid by the North Koreans to provide the provocation for a justifiable retaliatory move which the proposed force structure would permit developing into a full-scale assault on the North.

26 [25]. ROK national leadership believes that if reunification can be effected rapidly by military means, the great powers will not intervene and will accept the fait accompli.

27 [26]. Full US support of the April 5 MND plan, as we interpret it, is not justified in terms of present US objectives in Korea because it could lead to a military force capable of independently taking courses of action inimical to the US national interest.

28 [27]. Since there are adequate indicators that the North Korean military capability has, in the relatively recent past, been significantly improved and its total defense posture enhanced, and if, as the ROKs expect, the North will attempt to unify Korea by overt military means in 1970 or possibly sooner, the ROK/US defense posture requires improvement. To effect a defense posture capable of holding north of Seoul, in addition to the availability and timely arrival of envisaged US augmentation forces, certain elements of the plan would, if implemented, contribute to this objective. Extensive hardening of forward positions is necessary: improvements in infrastructure for army, navy and air force needs should be undertaken, particularly construction for airfield dispersal and hardening and to support an air LOC; facilities to permit rapid receipt and forward movement of external combat and logistic support should be provided; selected improvements in mobility and communications for the existing force structure are required; and, though not mentioned in the April 5 plan, the availability in the area and largely under US control, of ammunition war reserves for all services should be assured.”

Porter

1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 KOR S. Secret; Immediate; Specat. Repeated to the Department of State for Bundy, which is the source text.

2 Airgram A–505 from Seoul, April 10, transmitted a briefing paper prepared by the Korean Ministry of National Defense entitled “Problem Areas in the Republic of Korea Defense.” In addition to a Foreword, Conclusions, and two annexes, the paper addressed five areas: (A) Defense of ROK, (B) ROK Force Improvement Plan, (C) Home Reserve Forces—Armament, (D) ROK Force Levels, and (E) $100 Million Package. (Ibid.)

3 Not found.

4 Porter forwarded a copy of the staff analysis, “ROKG Strategic Intentions and Military Planning—A Politico-Military Assessment,” to the Department of State as an enclosure to Airgram A–521, April 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 KOR S)

5 The numbers in brackets reflect the paragraph numbers used in the original document. The Embassy also sent two press articles to the Department of State containing reports of Pak's comments to reporters en route to Honolulu. The articles, one from the Korea Herald and one from the Korea Times, both April 18, had in the Embassy's view “an interesting relationship to the line of thought reflected” in this staff analysis. (Airgram A–535 from Seoul, April 19; ibid.)




    



  • |
facebook twitter google plus pinterest kakao story band
Profile image 폴라리스 2013.11.04. 19:20
어느 패러럴 월드의 한국인지 ㅎㅎ 무슨 능력으로 저런 생각을 했었는지 궁금해집니다.
Profile image minki 2013.11.04. 19:25
그 당시면 1인당 GNP도 북한이 더 높았던 시절인데....
Profile image 김민석(maxi) 2013.11.04. 19:35
패기 하나는 갑이지만 사실은 허세고, 이 허세로 우리가 얻은게 없진 않았으나... 자만심도 얻은게 단점일까요?
Profile image TRENT 2013.11.04. 19:37
그 당시는 can do spirit 이 한창 일어날 시기였죠^^
네비아찌 2013.11.05. 02:12
그때 만약에 저게 실천되서 한국이 북진했다면 지금 쯤 우리는 모두 김정은놈 사진에 굽실거렸을 뻔 했겠네요.
Profile image 김민석(maxi) 2013.11.05. 04:13
그때 한국이 북진했다고 해서 북한이 꼭 이겼으리라는 보장은 없을 것 같습니다. 군사력은 남한이 열세했지만 당시 북-중 북-소 동맹이 다 엉망이라서 지원을 받기가 힘들었었죠.
백선호 2013.11.05. 16:12
1967년 8월 5일 미국 국무성 보고서를 보면 이 때 한국이 "차리리 중국이 베트남전에 참전하면 좋겠다, 아예 이 기회에 중국 본토에서 공산주의를 뿌리뽑자"며 마치 조선 효종의 북벌론같은 대륙 정벌의 꿈을 보여주기도 했습니다.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v05/d269

" the Koreans expressed the hope that China would enter the war, which they believed would result in the elimination of communism in China "
Profile image Mi_Dork 2013.11.05. 16:34
패기 하나는 돋네요. 중국 본토에서 빨갱이 발본색원이라니 ㅋㅋ
백선호 2013.11.05. 16:19
그리고 베트남에서도 인천상륙작전 비슷한 것을 해보는 것은 어떠냐고 미국에게 제안했다가 미국이 "그러면 병력 더 보내주세요" 하자 우리는 "없던 얘기로 합시다"라고 꼬리를 내렸다고 합니다.

" Some, particularly the Koreans, favored an Inchon-type landing behind the DMZ. However, when the need for additional ground forces for such activity was pointed out, their ardor for them waned rapidly. "
Profile image 자료수집꾼 2013.11.06. 07:39
했으면 하노이로 상륙작전이 전개했을것 같군요.. 그런데 왜 꼬리를 내렸을까요?;; 그것도 의문이네요.
Profile image 폴라리스 2013.11.06. 08:00
한국에서 병력빼서 상륙작전하면...............누가 좋아했을까요? -.-
Profile image 자료수집꾼 2013.11.06. 08:13
뭐 북한이 좋아는 했겠지만..주한미군이 계속 있었잖아요? 실제로도 미군때문에 당시에는 못내려오던 형편이었구요.
Profile image 폴라리스 2013.11.06. 08:17
글쎄요....주한미군 있다고 도발 안했던것도 아니구요. 제 생각에는 당시 미국은 월남전에 더 신경을 쓰던 터라 비상시 증원도 그리 쉽지는 않았을 겁니다. 그래서 병력을 더 빼는데 주저했던 것이 아닌가 싶네요.

밀리돔 | milidom 의 저작물은 이용약관에 의거해 이용 가능합니다. 이 라이선스의 범위 이외의 이용허락은 별도로 문의하시기 바랍니다.

글/댓글 작성 전 이용약관을 숙지는 의무사항입니다. 규정 미준수에 의한 책임은 온전히 작성자 본인에게 있습니다.